On the Cybersecurity of Traffic Signal Control System with Connected Vehicles
主讲人:冯毅恒
邀请人:田野
时间:2020年10月23日(周五)10:00-11:00
地点:腾讯会议链接:https://meeting.tencent.com/s/uqSv5D6cPCic
会议 ID:870 148 770
主讲人简介:
Dr. Yiheng Feng is an assistant professor at Lyles School of Engineering, Purdue University. He received his Ph.D. from Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering at University of Arizona. His research areas include connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) and smart transportation infrastructure, with a focus on traffic control with CAVs. He has served as PI and Co-PI in many research projects funded by NSF, USDOT, USDOE, Crash Avoidance Metric Partnership (CAMP), and Ford Motor Company. He has rich experiences in deploying and testing CV/CAV technologies in the field and has been involved in several large-scale CV deployment projects including MMITSS, Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) and Ann Arbor Connected Vehicle Testing Environment (AACVTE). He has published more than 50 research articles, which appeared in top transportation journals, including Transportation Research Part B, Transportation Research Part C, and IEEE Transactions on ITS. He is the recipient of the inaugural best dissertation award from the Chinese Overseas Transportation Association (COTA).
主讲内容简介:
Connected vehicle (CV) technology brings both opportunities and challenges to the traffic signal control (TSC) system. The connectivity of vehicles and transportation infrastructure may increase the risks of cyber threats. In the past few years, studies related to cybersecurity on the TSC system were proposed and conducted. However, the existing studies are rather scattered and there is still a lack of a systematic investigation that provides a comprehensive analysis framework. In this talk, I will introduce a generic analysis framework for the cybersecurity problem of the TSC in the CV environment. With potential threats towards the major components of the system and their corresponding impacts on safety and efficiency analyzed, data spoofing attack is considered as the most plausible and realistic attack approach. Based on this finding, different attack strategies and defense solutions are discussed. A case study is presented to show the impact of the data spoofing attacks against a selected CV based TSC system and corresponding mitigation countermeasures. This analysis framework is implemented in Mcity test facility at University of Michigan, with real transportation infrastructure and V2X communication network.
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